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Chace: Golden Ticket Out of Corporate Liability

IS EXTRATERRITORIALITY THE GOLDEN TICKET OUT OF
CORPORATE LIABILITY? HOW THE MODERN-DAY WILLY
WONKA’S CHOCOLATE FACTORY EVADED LIABILITY UNDER
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE IN NESTLÉ V. DOE
Alyaa Chace*
Only when the last tree has died, and the last river been poisoned,
and the last fish been caught, will we realize we cannot eat money. 1
-Cree Indian Proverb
ABSTRACT
The Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) was drafted as part of the
Judiciary Act of 1789. It was intended to provide federal courts with
the jurisdiction to hear civil actions brought by foreign plaintiffs for
torts committed in violation of the law of nations or other United States
treaty. After a two-hundred-year dormancy period, the Statute has
since been revived and become a vehicle by which foreign plaintiffs
seek redress for environmental and human rights offenses carried out
on foreign soil, often at the hands of United States corporations.
However, the Supreme Court continues to limit the reach of the Statute,
imposing a hurdle of extraterritoriality, which prevents the Court from
offering relief when the harms alleged have not touched or concerned
U.S. soil. Regardless of whether these harms were orchestrated on
U.S. soil and carried out by U.S. corporations, so long as the harms
occurred on foreign soil, U.S. law cannot be invoked. This application
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is antithetical to the statutory intent of the ATS and the modern practice
of international law. It has resulted in decisions that favor corporate
defendants, allowing them to bypass liability for even the most
egregious rights violations. In contrast, the United Kingdom has
circumvented this hurdle by focusing not on sufficient proximity, but
on general impositions of tort law, particularly in evaluating whether
parent corporations breached a duty of care rightfully owed to
claimants. This Note analyzes the UK Supreme Court approach as a
means of overcoming the extraterritoriality limitation of the ATS.
Among other advantages, this approach will fulfill the Statute’s intent,
enabling plaintiffs to obtain redress and allowing federal courts the
jurisdiction to condemn corporate defendants for atrocities carried out
on foreign soil at the expense of foreign nationals and their land.
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INTRODUCTION

Nemo bis punitur pro eodem delicto…in fact, some aren’t
punished at all.2 Corporate liability under the Alien Tort Statute has
been the subject of debate since the Statute’s revival in 1976.3 The
ATS was passed as a part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 in an effort to
cure the defects of the Articles of Confederation, which James
Madison referred to as “an inadequate vehicle for guiding the fastgrowing United States and its more than three million people through
a treacherous world.”4 The ATS, presently codified in 28 U.S.C. §
1350, provides that, “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations 5 or a treaty of the United States.”6 Foreign plaintiffs
seeking redress in United States federal courts often depend on this
Statute when bringing claims regarding human and environmental
rights offenses carried out on foreign soil by corporate defendants. 7 In
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co,8 the Supreme Court held that the
ATS does not allow courts jurisdiction over actions brought for
violations of the law of nations occurring in territories outside of the
United States.9 The Court held that any extraterritorial application of
United States law goes against the legislative intent of the ATS.10 The
alleged offenses would have to “touch and concern” U.S. territory with
“sufficient force” in order to overcome the extraterritorial limitation. 11
2

WILLY WONKA AND THE CHOCOLATE FACTORY (Wolper Pictures 1971).
Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 442 U.S. 901 (1979).
4
JAMES MADISON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: A NARRATIVE HISTORY
FROM THE NOTES OF JAMES AND MADISON 5 (2005).
5
“[The law of nations] was a species of universal law…which eighteenth century
jurists did not hesitate to recognize as valid. It embraced three principal divisions:
the law merchant, the law maritime, and the body of law between states which is now
called public international law.” EDWARD DUMBAULD, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE
LAW OF NATIONS, 38 (1955) (ebook) (emphasis added) (citing to Dickinson, The
Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV.
26, 27 (1952); 1 WILLIAM CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1953).
6
28 U.S.C.A. § 1350.
7
Stephen Mulligan, The Rise and Decline of the Alien Tort Statute, Legal Sidebar
(Jun. 6, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10147.pdf.
8
569 U.S. 108 (2013).
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
3
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The Court further narrowed the application of the ATS in 2018 in the
case of Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC.12 Referencing its decision in
Kiobel, the Court held specifically that corporations may not be sued
under the ATS when the alleged violations took place outside the
United States.13
The Court’s decisions in Jesner and Kiobel foreclose corporate
liability for actions occurring outside the United States under the ATS,
notwithstanding alleged violations of the law of nations or United
States treaties.14 Generally, scholars agree that the Framers’ intent in
creating the ATS was to give federal courts jurisdiction over claims
brought by foreigners seeking redress for certain violations of
international law, particularly for violations of the law of nations.15 At
the time, the Framers were concerned with the national government’s
limited ability to enforce international law throughout the country. 16
Their concerns manifested in 1781 when the Continental Congress
appealed states’ punishment of violations of international law.17 They
began to realize the limitations of federal power that beset the Articles
of Confederation in that, among other things, the government
“possessed no domestic legislature or funding powers to implement
treaties.”18 An attack on a French diplomat in 1784 further emphasized
the need to expand governmental ability to enforce international law. 19
Justice Souter refers to this chain of events as “[t]he anxieties of the
pre-constitutional period.”20 As a result, the ATS was subsequently
drafted in 1789 as part of the Judiciary Act with the hope that it would
provide some amount of jurisdiction over international law violations
that existed at the time.
While it has been over two hundred years since the drafting of
the ATS, debate continues to exist surrounding the Statute’s
application to tort claims involving U.S. defendants for acts occurring
12

138 U.S. 1386 (2018).
Stephen Mulligan, The Rise and Decline of the Alien Tort Statute, Legal Sidebar
(Jun. 6, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10147.pdf.
14
Id. at 58.
15
Beth Stephens, The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1467 (2014).
16
Julian G. Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional
Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 Sup. Ct. Rev. 153 (2004).
17
Id. at 167.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
13
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outside United States territory. While judicial interpretation regarding
what constitutes an international violation has evolved relative to the
world’s changing standards of decency, the Court maintains a strong
stance on the lack of extraterritorial reach of the Statute. The issue
with the Court’s originalist reading of the Alien Tort Statute is that it
explicitly absolves corporations of accountability for violations of
recognized international norms, so long as the violation occurs outside
the “touch and concern” of United States soil. It is an incorrect
application of international law to focus on the issue of proximity of
the defendants’ misconduct to the United States, and remand or
dismiss a case based purely on an absolute extraterritorial prohibition.
This Note will argue that the Court’s two-step framework
established in Jesner for evaluating extraterritoriality issues under the
ATS needs to be amended. As such, Part II of this Note will review
the legislative history of the ATS including an analysis of the Framers’
intent. Part III will discuss the reawakening of the ATS with a
discussion of two hallmark cases, Filartiga v. Pena Irala21 and Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain.22 Part IV will focus on the application of the ATS
in recent cases, including the extraterritorial limitation established in
Kiobel and broad pardoning of corporate liability in Jesner. The final
sections of this Note will focus on the Supreme Court case of Nestlé
USA, Inc. v. Doe where the Court evaluated the companies’ conduct
and determined whether it was substantial enough to overcome the
extraterritorial presumption established in Kiobel. Further, this Note
will apply the analysis in the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court case
Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell Plc. to Nestlé to demonstrate how the
extraterritoriality prohibition should be revised. The ATS was
intended to be used as a way for plaintiffs to gain redress against
defendants that have violated international law; in order for it to be
exercised in the claimant-friendly way it was intended to be, the
extraterritoriality limitation needs to be evaluated and ultimately,
removed.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE

The Alien Tort Statute, a U.S. federal law adopted in 1789
originally as part of the Judiciary Act, provides federal courts with the
21
22

Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 99 U.S. 2424 (1979).
Alvarez-Machain, 124 U.S. at 2740.
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jurisdiction to hear any civil action brought by a foreign plaintiff for a
tort committed in violation of the law of nations or other United States
treaty.23 William Blackstone, a renowned English jurist of the
eighteenth century, viewed the law of nations as “a system of rules,
deducible by natural reason, and established by universal consent
among the civilized inhabitants of the world.” 24 Blackstone was a
natural law jurist and held great influence at the time the ATS was
drafted, especially over the founding generation. 25 Natural law jurists
accept that, “law can be considered and spoken of both as a sheer social
fact of power and practice, and as a set of reasons for action that can
be and often are sound as reasons and therefore normative for
reasonable people addressed by them.” 26 Essentially, natural law
jurists will use principles of practical reason as a method of reaching
substantive results both in law and in theory. 27
In the eighteenth century, violations of the law of nations
included violations of express safe-conducts, violations of the rights or
immunities of ambassadors and other public officials, infractions to
treaties to which the U.S. is a party, and piracy. 28 These categories of
offenses were prevalent at the time, but this list was in no way
considered to be exhaustive. 29 In fact, Congress encouraged States to
conduct tribunals to decide whether certain offenses should be added
as violations to the law of nations.30 Instead of interpreting the statute
on its face, or rather taking a “four corners” approach, natural jurists
believed it was important to employ methods of practical reason to
address evolving standards of decency should they arise.31 There was
an understanding that international issues that existed in the eighteenth
century would change as society further advanced and evolved. The

23

William Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to
the “Originalists,” 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 221 (1996).
24
Id. at 225-26. See also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *66-73.
25
Id. at 225-27.
26
Natural Law Theories, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Feb. 5, 2007).
27
Mark Murphy, The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics, THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Summer 2019 ed.), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/natural-law-ethics/.
28
See Dodge, supra note 23, at 227.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
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Alien Tort Statute was subsequently written to function as a means of
redressing future offenses to the law of nations.32
Today, jurists take a rather positivist approach to interpreting
the Alien Tort Statute. Legal positivists support a strict adherence to
the textual interpretation of existing law. 33 However, this vastly differs
from the modern practices of international lawyers and is largely
condemned by traditional natural law theorists, including Blackstone.
Leslie Green, a prominent analytical philosopher of law, articulated:
No legal philosopher can be only a legal positivist. A
complete theory of law requires also an account of what
kinds of things could possibly count as merits of law
(must law be efficient or elegant as well as just?); of
what role law should play in adjudication (should valid
law always be applied…and also of the pivotal
questions of what laws we should have and whether we
should have law at all. Legal positivism does not aspire
to answer these questions, though its claim that the
existence and content of law depends only on social
facts does give them shape. 34
The focus on facticity is part of what makes legal positivism
problematic. An institutional adherence to positivism fails to account
for relevant moral and political considerations that very much
contribute to the practice of law in modern society.
Today, Blackstone’s language describing the law of nations is
often alluded to in many decisions involving the Alien Tort Statute. In
Jesner v. Arab Bank, the defendant was accused of financing terrorist
organizations to carry out kidnappings, killings, and other violations
of international human rights abroad. 35 In order to evaluate whether
these acts would fall under the reach of the ATS, Justice Sotomayor
established a two-part test. In Part One, the Court is asked to determine
whether the violation of an international norm is one that is “accepted
by the civilized world.”36 If the answer is yes, and the norm allegedly
violated is “specific, universal, and obligatory,” the federal court may
32

Id. at 228.
Natural Law Theories, supra note 26.
34
Leslie N. Green, Legal Positivism, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Spring 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
35
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 U.S. 1386 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
36
Id. at 1413.
33
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recognize this as a cause of action. 37 This standard now clarifies what
an international norm entails and moreover, what a violation of such
norm involves. The standard, in a sense, refutes Justice Gorsuch’s
interpretation of Blackstone, which asserts the erroneous belief that the
First Congress did not mean to consider a violation of the law of
nations to arise under federal law, but under general common law. 38
Eighteenth century jurists regarded the law of nations as “part of the
laws of [the United States], and of every other civilized nation.” 39 At
the time, there was no delineation between state and federal common
law, and as such, the law of nations was considered “a binding part of
both state and federal law.” 40 For Justice Gorsuch to make this
delineation today is a mishandling of Blackstone’s interpretation of
customary international law violations. This is problematic because it
limits our understanding of violations of international norms, and in
turn, limits the court’s federal jurisdiction over these matters. Justice
Sotomayor’s two-part test pushes the needle forward by reinterpreting
what an international norm constitutes and opening the door for the
Court to access these causes of action.
A.

Corporate Liability Under the ATS

In analyzing the text and legislative intent of the Alien Tort
Statute, there exists no language that expressly excludes corporate
defendants from the class of defendants included under the Statute. 41
In fact, “international law imposes obligations, including substantive
prohibitions, that are intended to govern the behavior of states and
private actors,” including corporations. 42 The obligations include
“substantive prohibitions on certain conduct thought to violate human
rights, such as genocide, slavery, extrajudicial killing, and torture.” 43
International law determines what substantive conduct violates the law
of nations and it has not excluded corporations outside the scope of
actors capable of committing these violations, thus capable of being

37

Id. at 1390.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 99 U.S. 2424 (1979).
39
Stephens, supra note 15, at 1471 (quoting Charge to the Grand Jury for the District
of New York (Apr. 4, 1790), in N.H. GAZETTE (Portsmouth 1790)).
40
Id.
41
Id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1350
42
Id. at 3.
43
Id.
38
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tried under the Alien Tort Statute. The only limitation that has been
alluded to is a prohibition on filing suit against foreign corporations
due to concerns regarding maintaining peaceful foreign relations,
which will be further explained in this Note’s discussion of Jesner v.
Arab Bank.44 Because ATS claims often cause friction between the
United States and the nations where the alleged misconduct occurred,
enforcement mechanisms regarding how to punish foreign defendants
are often left to the foreign territory’s discretion. 45 The Court attributes
the responsibility to weigh foreign policy concerns to executive
branches, not the judiciary.46
III.

REAWAKENING OF THE ATS

After two hundred years, the Alien Tort Statute has reawakened
from its dormancy. The Statute was “reborn” in 1979 in Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala.47 In this case, the Second Circuit held that the Alien Tort
Statute granted federal courts jurisdiction over actions brought by
foreign plaintiffs seeking damages for violations of international
human rights law, including torture.48 The case of Filartiga v. PenaIrala involved two Paraguayan citizens, the family of seventeen-yearold Filartiga, who alleged that the defendant, Pena, an inspector
general of police, kidnapped, tortured and murdered Filartiga in
Paraguay in retaliation for his father’s political beliefs. 49 After
Filartiga’s father commenced a criminal action in Paraguay, the courts
had his attorney arrested and subsequently disbarred.50 Filartiga’s
sister later came to the United States seeking political asylum, and
while living in Washington D.C., she learned of Pena’s presence in
Brooklyn, NY.51 She reported this information to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service which arrested Pena and ordered his
deportation.52 While he was being held in Brooklyn, NY pending

44

Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC., 138 U.S. 1386 (2018).
Id. at 12.
46
Id. See also Stephen Mulligan, The Rise and Decline of the Alien Tort Statute,
Legal Sidebar (Jun. 6, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10147.pdf.
47
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
48
Id.
49
Id. at 878.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 878-79.
52
Id. at 879.
45
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deportation, Filartiga’s sister commenced a civil action against Pena
for the wrongful torture and death of her brother. 53
The appellants relied on the Alien Tort Statute, specifically the
provision that allows federal courts jurisdiction over civil actions for
torts committed in violation of the law of nations, to establish federal
jurisdiction for their claims. 54
Having examined customary
international law, including applicable case law, the UN Charter of the
Organization of American States, and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the Second Circuit held that “an act of torture
committed by a state official against one held in detention violates
established norms of the international law of human rights, and hence
the law of nations.”55 Therefore, because the law of nations, which is
considered a part of federal common law, was violated, subject matter
jurisdiction also existed. 56 Since this decision, the ATS’s reach has
expanded to cases involving torture, kidnapping, illegal detention,
genocide, environmental violations, and war crimes.57 The decision
was aligned with Blackstone’s and other natural law jurists’ intentions
of employing practical reasoning to ensure that future violations of
customary law would be added to the “list” to account for evolving
standards of decency.58
The decision in Filartiga reinstated the Alien Tort Statute as a
vehicle for foreign plaintiffs to bring suits against defendants for
human rights abuses. It recognized international law as part of the
federal common law. However, just fourteen years later in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain,59 the Supreme Court began to place strict limitations
on the Statute’s reach, specifically in regard to extraterritoriality. 60
The Supreme Court held that the Alien Tort Statute did not allow for
actions to be brought by private individuals for violations of the law of

53

Id.
Id. at 880.
55
Id.
56
Julian G. Ku et al., supra note 16, at 157.
57
Eric Engle, The Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victims’ Protection Act:
Jurisdictional Foundations and Procedural Obstacles, 14 WILLAMETTE J. OF INTL.
L.
AND
DISPUTE
RESOLUTION,
no.
1,
2006,
at
4,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/26211233.
58
See Dodge, supra note 23, at 227.
59
542 U.S. 692 (2004).
60
Stephen Mulligan, The Rise and Decline of the Alien Tort Statute, LEGAL SIDEBAR
(Jun. 6, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10147.pdf.
54
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nations that occurred outside of U.S. territory. 61 This case involved
the abduction and murder of a U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency
(“DEA”) official by a Mexican drug cartel in 1985. 62 The DEA hired
Mexican nationals to capture the defendant, who had participated in
the murder, and bring him back to the United States to be tried.63 The
defendant filed multiple suits against the United States and the
Mexican nationals, one of whom was Sosa, under the Alien Tort
Statute.64 The Court set forth a two-step framework, one similar in
kind to the approach taken by Justice Sotomayor in Jesner, in its
analysis: First, the Court determined whether the international norm
violated was one “accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms.”65 If yes, the Court would consider whether hearing the
case would be an appropriate exercise of judicial discretion. 66 Because
the Court did not recognize Alvarez-Machain’s claims against the
government regarding his capture as falling within the traditional
categories specified within the law of nations (i.e. piracy and
infractions against ambassadors), the Court did not even consider step
two of the framework.67 The Court stated that because the detention
of the officer was for less than one day, and the officer was kept in the
custody of law enforcement agents, there were no international norms
violated under the ATS that would provide redress for his claims.68
The limitations imposed on the ATS in the holding in Sosa can
be juxtaposed with the more expansive interpretation of international
norm violations in Filartiga. Sosa insists that federal courts should not
recognize violations of international norms that fall outside the
substantive historical conduct specified in the text of the Statute at the
time it was enacted. 69 In contrast, the Second Circuit in Filartiga
creates an analogy between modern conduct and historical conduct by
equating a modern torturer with a pirate who may have tortured a

61

Id.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 U.S. 2739 (2004).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 U.S. 1386 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
66
Sosa, 124 U.S. at 2727. See also id. at 1420.
67
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 U.S. 2739 (2004).
68
Id.
69
Id.
62
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slave.70 The strict adherence to the text of the ATS in Sosa is more
restrictive and almost reverses the decision in Filartiga on the ground
that the alleged conduct need be expressly condemned in the law of
nations. While the Alien Tort Statute continues to allow plaintiffs to
raise complex issues in federal court, judicial limitations on the
Statute’s reach continue to be narrowed, severely limiting foreign
plaintiffs’ success, and absolving liability of defendants for violations
of the law of nations in many circumstances.
IV.

JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF THE ALIEN TORT
STATUTE
A.

Limits on Jurisdiction Based on Extraterritoriality

In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum,71 the Court limited the
reach of the ATS strictly to conduct carried out on United States soil.72
The alleged conduct must substantially “touch and concern” the
territory of the U.S. in order for the Court to have jurisdiction over the
action.73 If the conduct occurred elsewhere, there could be no
extraterritorial application of United States law; in other words, the
action could not be brought under the ATS.74 In Kiobel, petitioners
filed a putative class action against Shell Petroleum Company of
Nigeria for its alleged complicity in human rights crimes carried out
by the Nigerian government. 75
Petitioners alleged unlawful
detainment, torture, and murder of Nigerian nationals, some of whom
were family members of petitioners. 76 The Second Circuit held that
the Alien Tort Statute did not impose civil liability on corporations
under any circumstance. 77 Like the Supreme Court later held in Jesner,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Kiobel concluded that in order
for corporations to be held civilly liable under the ATS, Congress

70

Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 U.S. 1386 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) at
1421.
71
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
72
Id. at 120-21.
73
Id. at 125.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 108.
76
Id.
77
Id.
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would need to explicitly make an exception. 78 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari.79
The issues on certiorari were (1) whether under the ATS,
corporations were immune from liability for violations of the law of
nations, including torture, extrajudicial executions, or genocide; and
(2) whether the ATS allows courts to recognize a cause of action for
violations of the law of nations occurring in territories outside of the
United States.80 The Court first addressed the second issue regarding
the extraterritorial application of United States law for violations of the
law of nations. The Court unanimously held that the traditional
interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute presumes that there be no
extraterritorial application of U.S. law.81 The Court relied on its
decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,82 which provides
that, “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an exterritorial
application, it has none.”83 Because the ATS does not expressly allow
extraterritorial reach, the Court held that any claims brought under the
ATS must allege conduct that has “touch[ed] and concern[ed]” United
States territory with “sufficient force.” 84 The decision in Kiobel
reaffirmed the decision in Sosa, permitting federal courts to recognize
common law violations of international law, but restricting any
application of U.S. law extraterritorially.
In Morrison, the Court evaluated whether the extraterritorial
application of a provision in the Securities and Exchange Act was a
jurisdictional question or one on the merits. 85 This was determined by
analyzing what conduct is expressly prohibited under the statute. 86
The Court stated that the ATS itself applied only to securities
transactions involving domestic dealings. 87 In evaluating the language
of the ATS, the Court found that the scope of the Statute did not

78

Id. See generally Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 U.S. 1386 (2018)
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Tyler Banks, Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: The Second
Circuit’s Misstep Around General Principles of Law in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., EMORY INT’L. L. REV. (2017).
86
Morrison, 130 U.S. at 2871.
87
Id. at 2869.
79

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2022

13

Touro Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 [2022], Art. 10

270

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 38

provide a cause of action for misconduct dealing with foreign stock
transactions.88
The holdings in Sosa, Morrison, and Kiobel strongly evince the
Supreme Court’s determination that the ATS does not allow
jurisdiction over claims involving conduct occurring outside of the
U.S.89 However, this conclusion is fundamentally flawed. The Court
takes the Statute’s lack of express extraterritorial authorization as a
prohibition on such application. A plain reading of the ATS specifies
“any civil action” in its statutory language, not expressly limiting civil
actions to those occurring domestically, like the Securities and
Exchange Act. The argument can just as easily be made that this
statutory language could also extend to conduct occurring outside of
the U.S. so long as there is a civil action regarding a violation of
customary international law. 90
In Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC.,91 the Court relied on Kiobel as
controlling precedent holding that the Alien Tort Statute does not allow
claims against foreign corporations when all the relevant conduct takes
place outside the United States.92 The case was brought by foreign
plaintiffs who accused the Arab Bank, headquartered in Jordan with a
branch functioning within the United States, of financing terrorist
organizations involved in the injuring, kidnapping, and killing of
civilians abroad.93 Petitioners claimed that the Bank used its New
York branch to transfer money to terrorists and launder money for a
Texas based charity with ties to Hamas. 94 The Court again excused
corporate liability based partially on its reasoning that the Bank’s
activities did not “touch” U.S. territory with sufficient force so as to
fall within the reach of the ATS.95
Like the defendants in Morrison, who were involved in
conducting stock transactions, the Bank’s activities in Jesner involved
CHIPS transactions, an electronic payment system that enables

88

Id.
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010); Kiobel, 569 U.S.
at 1660.
90
See 28 USC § 1350.
91
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC., 138 U.S. 1386 (2018).
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 1429.
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transactions and transfers to be carried out in U.S. dollars. 96 The
transactions were carried out in the Arab Bank’s New York branch and
a charity in Texas was used to transfer funds directly to terrorists. 97
Petitioners sought millions in damages from a Jordanian Bank for
attacks that were carried out by foreign terrorists in the Middle East. 98
The only way the extraterritorial hurdle could be overcome, according
to the majority in Jesner, was if the corporation was incorporated in
the United States or had its principal place of business in the United
States.99 The Court would then have personal jurisdiction which
would permit the Bank to be held accountable under U.S. law. 100
However, because the Court found that the Bank’s operations in New
York and Texas were too limited to satisfy the substantial “touch and
concern” requirement, the Court did not exercise personal jurisdiction
over the claims.101
The Court also emphasized that this litigation affected
diplomatic relations with Jordan, causing tension with a powerful
ally.102 Holding Arab Bank accountable could have damaging effects
on Jordan’s economy and the cooperative relationship that the U.S.
holds with Jordan as a counterterrorism ally. 103 The Court used
“judicial caution” in this case to guard against foreign policy concerns
and disruptions to foreign relations that could have larger
implications.104 This is the fragile side of holding foreign corporate
defendants liable and also demonstrates why suing foreign
corporations under the ATS is nearly impossible. The Court treads on
thin ice and seems to rely on the extraterritoriality limitation to hold
that the foreign defendant in Jesner could not be given its due under
the ATS.
This decision allowed a multinational corporation to be
excused from even the most egregious harms and violations of
international law merely because the acts did not take place on United

96

Id. at 1388.
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 1430 (quoting Daimler AF v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014)).
100
Id.
101
Id. at 1429.
102
Id. at 1390.
103
Id.
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Id. at 1391.
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States soil.105 Although both international and domestic law would
recognize these alleged harms as violations of the law of nations, the
extraterritorial argument in Kiobel creates an insurmountable
jurisdictional hurdle.
V.

OVERCOMING THE EXTRATERRITORIAL LIMITATION WITH
OKPABI V. ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC106

Many ATS cases brought in recent years involve foreign
corporations acting in complicity with governments to carry out
numerous rights violations. Most often, these corporate defendants are
accused of aiding and abetting under the Alien Tort Statute. In
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.,107 plaintiffs
alleged that Talisman Energy Inc., a Canadian oil and gas producer
extracting resources in Sudan, was complicit with the government of
Sudan in commissioning genocide, war crimes, resource pillaging, and
other crimes against humanity. 108 The district court denied Talisman’s
motion to dismiss on comity grounds for multiple reasons. The court
found that the action required a determination of whether Talisman
acted in violation of customary international law and that Canadian
courts, as opposed to U.S. courts, were not able to evaluate civil suits
for violations of international law. 109 Citing to the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Sosa, the district court also recognized that a cause of action
imposing accessorial liability for violations of international law under
the ATS was a viable cause of action and that plaintiffs would need to
present sufficient evidence demonstrating that the corporation acted
with the purpose of harming the affected civilians in Sudan.110
On appeal, the Second Circuit created a standard of mens rea
for aiding and abetting liability in ATS actions.111 The court held that
105

Id. at 1436.
Okpabi & Others v. Royal Dutch Shell Plc & Another [2021] UKSC 3.
107
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir.
2009). See J. Morrissey, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.:
Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, Minnesota Journal of
International Law, 2011, Vol. 20, pp. 144 et seq.
108
Id. at 251.
109
Id.
110
Id. See generally Alvarez-Machain, supra note 66, at 2739 (emphasis added).
111
J. Morrissey, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.: Aiding and
Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, Minnesota Journal of International
Law, 2011, Vol. 20, pp. 145 et seq.
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in order for plaintiffs to succeed on an aiding and abetting claim, they
must show that the corporation had purpose, rather than mere
knowledge, in working with the government to carry out these
violations.112 Otherwise, the court could not impose civil liability on
foreign corporations.113 The reason for the narrowness of this standard
is explained in Kiobel, where the Supreme Court regarded aiding and
abetting suits filed under the Alien Tort Statute as a means for plaintiffs
to “use corporations as surrogate defendants to challenge the conduct
of foreign defendants.”114 Essentially, the prevailing view amongst
U.S. federal courts is that aiding and abetting is too vague of a cause
of action under the ATS, and has resulted in the courts’ creation of a
standard of proof too high for plaintiffs to overcome. 115
Notably, in Okpabi v. Royal Dutch Shell Plc.,116 a United
Kingdom Supreme Court case, the Court circumvented this hurdle
involving corporate conduct in extraterritorial disputes by taking a
completely different approach. 117 The case involved over 40,000
citizens of a farming and fishing community in the Niger Delta
(“Claimants”), called the Ogale Community. 118 The Claimants alleged
that numerous oil spills occurred as a result of the oil multinational’s
operations in the region.119 “[T]hese oil spills…caused widespread
environmental damage, including serious water and ground
contamination,” that contaminated the drinking water and disabled the
community members from safely fishing, farming, and washing as
needed.120 The suit was brought against Royal Dutch Shell (“RDS”)
and its Nigerian subsidiary, Shell Petroleum Development Company
of Nigeria Ltd. (“SPDC”).121 Claimants alleged that RDS should be
held accountable for its subsidiary’s actions, owing Claimants a duty
of care which was ultimately breached when foreseeable
environmental damages occurred in the Community.122 Claimants

112

Id. at 151.
Id.
114
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC., 138 U.S. 1386 (2018).
115
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
116
Okpabi & Others v. Royal Dutch Shell Plc & Another [2021] UKSC 3.
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maintained that since RDS exerted significant control and oversight
over SPDC’s operations and were responsible for promulgating
defective safety policies that were implemented by SPDC in the Niger
Delta, they should assume responsibility for SPDC’s actions. 123
In considering these claims, the UK Court referred to its
decision in Vedanta v. Lungowe.124 The Court wrote that focusing on
sufficient proximity is not the correct approach because ‘the liability
of parent companies in relation to the activities of their subsidiaries is
not, of itself, a distinct category of liability in common law
negligence’…It raises no novel issues of law and is to be determined
on ordinary, general principles of the law of tort regarding the
imposition of a duty of care.125
The Court further expanded on how to determine whether a
duty of care arises in the context of a parent/subsidiary relationship:
“[W]hether a duty of care arises: ‘…depends on the extent to which,
and the way in which, the parent availed itself of the opportunity to
take over, intervene in, control, supervise or advise the management of
the relevant operation (including land use) of the subsidiary.”126
Essentially, it is insufficient for the Court to focus merely on control
and proximity. Instead, the Court needs to evaluate “the extent to
which the parent did take over or share with the subsidiary the
management of the relevant activity.”127 In this case, the relevant
activity was pipeline operation, which was the direct cause of the oil
spillage and subsequent water contamination.
The UK Court, after applying this standard, found that the
Court of Appeals erred in treating the parent’s liability as a separate
and distinct category of negligence. 128 Unlike the vague standard set
forth in Presbyterian, which urges the Court to find that the
corporation had purpose in aiding and abetting foreign governments,
the standard in Vedanta and subsequent application in Okpabi,

123

Id. at 7-8.
Id. (Vedanta v. Lungowe involved Zambian villagers suing Vedanta UK and its
Zambia subsidiary for environmental damages occurring in the region as a result of
Vedanta operations.).
125
Id. (quoting Vedanta Resources PLC and Another v. Lungowe & Others [2019]
UKSC 20).
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Id. (quoting Vedanta Resources PLC and Another v. Lungowe & Others [2019]
UKSC 20 at para 49).
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Id. at 36.
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provides sufficient detail to determine the level of involvement the
parent needed to meet in order to be held accountable for conduct
carried out by its subsidiaries on foreign land.129 In other words, the
“not my backyard, not my problem” perspective is defeated, so long as
plaintiffs can make a sufficient showing that the parent played a
substantial role in managing, directing, and overseeing the actions that
ultimately perpetuated the damages or harms. Not only does this give
plaintiffs asserting aiding and abetting allegations a fighting chance, it
also more importantly circumvents the extraterritorial limitation
imposed on the ATS. Instead of focusing on proximity and applying
the “touch and concern” standard, allowing claimants the chance to
show whether a duty of care has been breached is not only more in line
with customary tort law, but it also expands the jurisdictional reach of
the ATS, as it was intended to be. This standard was introduced by the
appellants’ case which contended that a duty of care, under Vedanta’s
interpretation of the duty, arose from RDS’s exercise of substantial
control and dominion over the management and monitoring of SPDC’s
operations.130
VI.

APPLICATION OF THE VEDANTA/OKPABI DUTY OF CARE
STANDARD TO NESTLÉ V. DOE

The recent United States Supreme Court case, Nestlé USA, Inc.
v. Doe I,131 presented the Court with another claim brought by foreign
respondents under the Alien Tort Statute. The respondents in this case
were former enslaved children from the Ivory Coast who were
kidnapped and forced to work for fourteen hours a day without pay on
cocoa plantations.132
The petitioners, Nestlé USA, Inc., a
multinational corporation, and Cargill, Inc., a domestic corporation,
were involved in extensively sourcing and producing cocoa in the
Ivory Coast. The respondents alleged that petitioners should be held
liable under the ATS for aiding and abetting a system of child slave
129

See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir.
2009), Vedanta Resources PLC and Another v. Lungowe & Others [2019] UKSC
20, and Okpabi & Others v. Royal Dutch Shell Plc & Another [2021] UKSC 3.
130
Id. at 8 (citing specifically to RDS’s responsibilities over SPDC, their rulemaking
authority in enacting global health and safety policies, and their handling of SPDC’s
assets and facilities, among other things).
131
Nestlé USA, Inc. v. John Doe I, No. 19-416, Slip Op. (S. Ct. 2021).
132
Id. at 2.
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labor in the Ivory Coast.133 The companies have continued to reap the
benefits of cheap cocoa in the Ivory Coast due to “a system built on
child slavery to depress labor costs.”134 The U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California granted the petitioners’ motion to
dismiss, holding that corporations could not be held liable under the
ATS and that the respondents failed to prove that the conduct relevant
to the Statute occurred in some capacity in the United States.135 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District
Court’s dismissal holding that aiding and abetting crimes fall within
the ATS’s scope.136 The Court of Appeals further held that the narrow
domestic conduct alleged by the respondents, specifically regarding
the petitioners’ spending of money in order to maintain ongoing
business with the cocoa farms and U.S. employees’ involvement in
inspecting the operation of the farms in the Ivory Coast, were relevant
to the allegations made under the ATS.137 For these reasons, the court
remanded the case to allow respondents the opportunity to amend their
complaint to include details on whether the conduct that occurred
outside the U.S. could be attached to the domestic corporation itself.138
There was an outpouring of amicus briefs on the issues during
the time the Supreme Court case was pending. In a Brief for the
National Confectioners Association, the World Cocoa Foundation, and
the European Cocoa Association in support of petitioners, the authors
wrote:
The decision of the court of appeals represents the
worst form of judicial intrusion into foreign relations
under the Alien Tort Statute…if left to stand, [it] risks
undoing the progress achieved under the collaborative
framework the political branches chose to address
forced child labor on overseas cocoa farms, and

133

Id. at 4.
Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe I, Oyez, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-416 (last
visited May 6, 2022).
135
Nestlé USA, Inc. v. John Doe I, No. 19-416, Slip Op. (S. Ct. 2021).
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discouraging American companies from participating
in future efforts139
Many cocoa manufacturers feared that if the respondents were able to
overcome the presumption of extraterritoriality, many American
companies would become vulnerable to ATS lawsuits. After all, both
Nestlé USA, Inc. and Cargill Inc. maintain headquarters in the United
States, which regularly manage corporate operations overseas.140 The
companies were laden with fear that respondents would succeed in
proving that the conduct, while it had occurred on Ivory Coast soil, had
been managed from U.S. based headquarters, touching, and concerning
with sufficient force, United States territory. 141
The Supreme Court ultimately held in an 8-1 opinion that the
respondents improperly sought an extraterritorial application of the
ATS.142 The conduct related to aiding and abetting indicated a “mere
corporate presence” relating more to general corporate activity than
domestic conduct occurring in the U.S.143 In deciding the case, the
Court once again referred to Kiobel, stating that “the ATS does not
expressly…evince a ‘clear indication of extraterritoriality’” and that
respondents “must establish that ‘the conduct relevant to the statute’s
focus occurred in the United States…even if other conduct occurred
abroad.”144 Essentially, even if the claimants alleged relevant conduct
under the Statute, there would be no redress if they could not prove the
conduct occurred within the United States. This holding is aligned
with the Court’s rulings in both Kiobel and Presbyterian, in that it
quashes claimants at the gateway. 145 To arrive at this determination,
the Court applied a two-step framework for analyzing the issues of
extraterritoriality explaining that:

139

Brief for The National Confectioners Association, et al. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 2, Nestlé USA, Inc., v. John Doe I, No. 19-416 & 19-453
(U.S. Oct. 28, 2019).
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Nestlé USA, Inc. v. John Doe I, No. 19-416, Slip Op. (S. Ct. 2021) at 5.
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See generally Brief for The National Confectioners Association, et al. as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2, Nestlé USA, Inc. v. John Doe I, et al., No. 19-416
& 19-453 (U.S. Oct. 28, 2019).
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[F]irst, [they] presume that a statute applies only
domestically, and [they] ask, ‘whether the statute gives
a clear, affirmative indication’ that rebuts this
presumption…Second, where the statute…does not
apply extraterritorially, plaintiffs must establish that
‘the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in
the United States.’146
Contrary to the duty of care standard applied in Okpabi, the Court
limits its evaluation of the relevant conduct to only the conduct
occurring in the United States, focusing on proximity and less on
substantive actions.
While the Court stated that general corporate operations are
insufficient to overcome the extraterritorial hurdle, its evaluation of
these operations is lacking and overlooks the fact that both companies
extensively managed and economically aided the cocoa plantations in
the Ivory Coast from United States soil. 147 Henceforth, the standard
for evaluating whether Nestlé USA and Cargill owed the Ivory Coast
nationals a duty of care will be applied pursuant to the Okpabi/Vedanta
standard.148
To reiterate, in Okpabi, the United Kingdom Supreme Court
held the parent company accountable for actions carried out by its
foreign subsidiary because they exercised substantial corporate control
in creating the policies that were implemented by their Nigerian
subsidiaries, which in turn breached their common law duty of care to
protect Nigerian nationals against foreseeable harms arising out of oil
extraction.149 The UK Court determined that this conduct surpassed
general corporate activity due to the extent to which the parent
146

Nestlé USA, Inc. v. John Doe I, No. 19-416, Slip Op. (S. Ct. 2021) at 4-5 (citation
omitted).
147
Id.
148
See generally Nestlé USA, Inc. v. John Doe I, No. 19-416, Slip Op. (S. Ct. 2021)
(Justice Alito, the only dissenter in this case, argued that if an ATS claim could be
brought against a natural U.S. citizen, it should also be allowed to be brought against
a domestic corporation. Justice Sotomayor partially concurred with Justice Thomas,
except in his narrow application of the ATS that did not find applicable any tort that
was not enumerated expressly in the statutory language itself, an application that
Justice Sotomayor deemed in contravention with the ATS’s intent and the Court’s
holding in Sosa. Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh agreed in a concurring opinion
that the Court lacked discretion to create a new cause of action for extraterritorial
claims under the statute, power that can only be exercised by Congress.).
149
Id. at 3.
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company delegated and managed its subsidiary from UK soil. 150
Nestlé USA and Cargill are both U.S. based companies that are
involved with the purchasing, processing, and selling of cocoa in the
Ivory Coast.151 While they did not personally own cocoa farms in the
Ivory Coast, they were extensively involved in managing and funding
many of the farms located there. 152 “They . . . provided those farms
with technical and financial resources — such as training, fertilizer,
tools, and cash — in exchange for the exclusive right to purchase
cocoa.”153 Moreover, respondents alleged that the petitioners “knew
or should have known” that enslaved children were working the
plantations.154 The petitioners allegedly had “economic leverage over
the farms but failed to exercise it to eliminate child slavery.” 155
The petitioners argued that a domestic parent company
exercising oversight over its subsidies in the Ivory Coast was not
enough to surmount the presumption of extraterritoriality under the
ATS. The Court, after brief review, aligned its holding with the
petitioners concluding that the conduct alleged was general corporate
activity.156 It regarded the conduct as mere decision making, which
although were made and approved of in the United States, could not
sufficiently overcome the extraterritorial application. 157
In Okpabi, the Court made the important delineation between
a parent that controls operations versus a parent that issues mandatory
policies:
[I]t is . . . important to distinguish between a parent
company which controls, or shares control of, the
material operations on the one hand, and a parent
company which issues mandatory policies and
standards which are intended to apply throughout a
group of companies in order to ensure conformity with
particular standards. The issuing of mandatory policies
plainly cannot mean that a parent has taken control of
the operations of Page 36 a subsidiary (and, necessarily,
150
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every subsidiary) such as to give rise to a duty of
care.158
The Court referred to Vedanta as an example. In this case, the
plaintiffs relied on group-wide policies and group guidelines to
demonstrate the level of control exercised by the parent on the
subsidiary.159 The Court held that this was insufficient to show the
parent company had substantial control over their subsidiary so as to
overcome the presumption of extraterritoriality. These facts are
distinguishable from the facts in Nestlé USA where the parent
corporation did not merely implement policies, it actively managed
and funded cocoa farms to gain exclusive rights over their cocoa
production.160 In a sense, the plantations were employed by the
companies and the child slaves were effectively employees. As
respondents contended, the companies were in a position of economic
superiority. The cocoa farms were subsidized by the companies’ funds
and the companies, allegedly knowing of the child exploitation on
these farms, did not withhold or abstain from funding or aiding the
farms to stop the child exploitation. As the Court specified, control
“depends on: ‘extent to which, and the way in which, the parent availed
itself of the opportunity to take over, intervene in, control, supervise,
or advise the management of the relevant operations…of the
subsidiary.”161 The way in which the parent companies in the Nestlé
USA case controlled the “subsidiary” was not in policy
implementation. The parent company was supplying the farms with
the resources they needed to operate in order to gain exclusive control
over the cocoa manufactured therein. This not only supersedes general
corporate activity, but is a tacit way of gaining control of an entity
through economic superiority. The companies profited from the cheap
labor and continued to fund a system of child exploitation to their own
avail.
The holding in Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe is problematic in
multiple ways. First, it narrows the extraterritorial limitation on the
ATS by setting forth vague guidelines on what constitutes general
corporate liability and what constitutes extensive control sufficient to
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Okpabi & Others v. Royal Dutch Shell Plc & Another [2021] UKSC 3 at 35.
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overcome the presumption. However, in Okpabi, the Court is specific
in explaining that implementation of operational policies is de facto
management of a company and constitutes general corporate
activity.162 Nevertheless, in Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, the Court
classified privately funding and supplying entities to carry out the
production of a globally consumed product as “general corporate
activity.”163
This decision makes permissible violations of
“international and domestic standards relating to the responsibilities of
business enterprises in relation to human rights ….”164 It applies a
vague standard, similar to the still undefined “touch and concern”
standard, in order to sidestep resolving issues of accountability. This
stands contrary to the purpose of the ATS, intended to be a claimantfriendly statute, capable of addressing these violations head-on. These
arbitrary measures of general corporate activity and proximity to U.S.
territory are inconsistent with not only the intentions of the ATS, but
more generally, customary international law. In the literal sense, this
is nothing short of a misappropriation of justice.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Where does this leave us? After Kiobel, the Supreme Court’s
stance on extraterritorial application of U.S. law was established. The
presumption against extraterritoriality could not be overcome unless
plaintiffs could prove that the conduct at issue had touched and
concerned the territory of the United States. Unless the Court expands
on the holdings in Kiobel, Jesner, or more broadly, on the limitation
on extraterritoriality, the results will remain the same. More cases
alleging relevant misconduct under the Statute will continue to be
dismissed simply because the conduct has occurred outside of United
States soil.
While most of the corporations in cases brought under the
Alien Tort Statute are “American” companies in all sense of identity,
the misconduct they are implicated in usually occurs overseas, making
it difficult to invoke United States law. If the U.S. federal courts were
to invoke Okpabi and apply the standard set forth in Vedanta, the
courts would have a more focused and detailed protocol for evaluating
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relevant corporate conduct and determining whether substantial
control has been exercised; this would enable the Court to hold parent
corporations liable for actions carried out by its agents or subsidiaries.
It is likely that had the standard been applied in Nestlé USA, Inc. v.
Doe, the actions of the parent companies may have been found to
surpass general corporate activities. The conduct entailed more than
decision-making and implementation of group principles; the
companies’ actions manifested an active purpose to supply cocoa
farms in order to benefit from cheap labor at the expense of enslaved
children. Not only does this touch and concern a U.S. domestic
multinational with sufficient force, it also exposes a breach of
customary international law. While this may not allow for all claims
alleging violations occurring outside the United States to be brought
against domestic defendants, it does pierce the corporate veil enough
to offer foreign claimants a fighting chance.
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